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Abstract—The paper describes templates for model-based analysis of usability and safety aspects of user interface software design.
The templates crystallize general usability principles commonly addressed in user-centred safety requirements, such as the ability to
undo user actions, the visibility of operational modes, and the predictability of user interface behavior. These requirements have
standard forms across different application domains, and can be instantiated as properties of specific devices. The modeling and
analysis process is carried out using the Prototype Verification System (PVS), and is further facilitated by structuring the specification
of the device using a format that is designed to be generic across interactive systems. A concrete case study based on a commercial
infusion pump is used to illustrate the approach. A detailed presentation of the automated verification process using PVS shows how
failed proof attempts provide precise information about problematic user interface software features.
Index Terms—Human-Computer Interaction, Model-based development, Formal specifications, Formal verification, Prototype
Verification System (PVS).
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Demonstrating that a device design satisfies safety require-
ments is part of a process that provides regulators with
confidence that there are barriers that mitigate identified
hazards. Many standards propose requirements that should
be verified to demonstrate safety (i.e., that the device does
not harm people). Some of these safety requirements are
use-centred and domain specific, for example [1] “The pump
shall issue an alert if paused for more than t minutes”.
User interface software issues are an important reason
for system or device failure in application domains such as
healthcare, avionics, and traffic control. Despite this, little
work has been done to provide tool support for the analysis
of use-related requirements. We therefore consider the ques-
tion: given an interactive device, can formal techniques be used
to assess whether the design of the device satisfies requirements
that concern its usability? The aim is to provide an assess-
ment method for the design of core user interface software
components that is more concise and complete than existing
techniques based on code inspection and testing.
Formal verification of user interface software has seen
slow take-up because verification technology is perceived
as difficult to use and to apply. A review of formal tools
and techniques [2] places these barriers on three dimensions:
implementation cost, specification cost and verification cost.
The work described here aims to reduce these three costs by
introducing a systematic process for early detection of user
interface software issues at the design stage (see discussion
in Section 2.1). The results of the analysis are of interest
beyond software engineering and must also be meaningful
to other disciplines, for example related to the domain or
to human factors. In these cases clear demonstrations of
the implications of the results are necessary so that con-
Manuscript received mm, yyyy; revised mm, yyyy.
siderations of the meaning of requirements and exceptions
that arise through the analysis are possible. Furthermore the
requirements should have the effect of improving the safety
and usability of the interactive system for the user.
We introduce property templates to facilitate the intro-
duction of formal methods technologies in the develop-
ment life-cycle of core user interface components. These
templates describe general user-centred requirements that
can be adopted to analyze essential usability aspects of the
device and, if true, can mitigate hazards that might arise
through use error. The developed templates are instantiated
to the details of the particular device represented by a
formal specification of its design. The instantiated properties
are then used within a formal verification system to analyze
the conditions under which the device design satisfies the
property.
Model development and verification will be illustrated
using a medical device currently found in many hospitals
across the EU and US. We will show that the analysis, based
on templates, enables the identification of inconsistencies
that can result in poor understanding of the user interface
and increase the risk of use errors with the potential for
harm to the patient.
An initial model of the specific medical device had
already been developed. It had been developed using Modal
Action Logic (MAL) [3], the language of the IVY [4] tool.
IVY uses NuSMV [5], a model checker, as back-end for
formal verification. This initial model was suitable for the
analysis of properties of the modal behavior of the device,
such as whether data entry modes were presented by the
device without ambiguity [6]. The model has been extended
to allow the analysis of the number entry system of the
device. One effect of this extension was that the size of the
model increased significantly, making the use of the NuSMV
model checker time consuming and, for various properties
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related to number entry, infeasible (see also [7]). We there-
fore decided to change verification technology. Our option
was the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [8], which is
a theorem proving assistant. This technology differs from
model-checking, which relies on automatic and exhaustive
exploration of execution paths described in a model. Theo-
rem proving builds on logic formulas and deduction meth-
ods, which better support the analysis of richer properties,
and can better handle domains of variables with larger
cardinality. The downside of using theorem proving is that
the verification process is not fully automatic and temporal
properties cannot be proved without adding constructs to
the model. The theorem prover often needs guidance to
complete the proof of complex properties. Overall, our ex-
perience of the available tools led to the conclusion that the
benefits of using theorem proving outweighed the potential
disadvantages arising from the lack of automation for two
reasons.
• Translating the original MAL model into a PVS model
was fairly straightforward thanks to the expressiveness
of the PVS language. A manual translation of the MAL
model into the language of a model checker, different
from that supported by IVY, would have required an
excessive amount of time and effort.
• A prototyping tool, PVSio-web [9], is available that
makes it possible to generate an interactive simulation1
of the device based on the developed PVS model. This
simulation proved significant in validating hypotheses
embedded in the model, as well as for discussing the
analyzed properties and the results of the analysis with
software engineers and end users of the device (i.e.,
nurses and medical device trainers).
Contribution. Three main contributions are offered.
1) A systematic process for the analysis of the design of
core user interface software components is described. It
can be performed either as part of a model-based de-
velopment process, or retrospectively, by constructing
a model of an existing design.
2) Property templates are described that capture general
user-centred safety requirements related to user inter-
face software design. These requirements are translated
into logic formulas that can be checked using PVS or
equivalent verification technology.
3) A case study is described based on a commercial med-
ical device in use in many hospitals. The verification
results can be used to complement and support test
data necessary to demonstrate that the design of core
user interface software components meets general user-
centred safety requirements.
The full specification and the documentation of the illus-
trated case study may be found at our repository2 and on
Github3.
Organization. Section 2 frames the work within the context
of a software development process and relevant interna-
tional standards. Section 3 provides background informa-
1. http://www.pvsioweb.org/demos/AlarisGP
2. http://hcispecs.di.uminho.pt/m/5
3. http://github.com/haslab/hcispecs/archive/1.1.zip
tion about the PVS specification and verification language.
Section 4 introduces the medical device used for illus-
tration throughout the paper. Section 5 presents the PVS
model of the selected medical device. Section 6 provides
the main contribution, illustrating the property templates
and demonstrating how the templates are instantiated to
the details of the model. Relevant aspects of the verification
process are presented and discussed. Section 7 presents a fi-
nal discussion of the benefits of the method. Further related
research beyond that described in Section 7 is presented in
Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE: DESIGNING FOR
SAFETY
The focus of the paper is user interface software. Of particular
interest is the design of core software components responsible for
human-machine interaction. These modules are safety-critical
in the sense that latent anomalies in their design can lead
to use error and potential harm. An example of such an
anomaly recently involved a commercial medical device. A
diabetes management mobile app erroneously resets the rec-
ommended insulin bolus dosage when the user changes the
smartphone’s orientation. This feature opens the possibility
that the user inadvertently commands and receives unsafe
insulin therapies [10].
The next sub-sections frame the contribution of the
paper. Typical activities carried out within a software en-
gineering process are first considered. The contribution is
then related to three international standards that address
usability and safety concerns in the context of medical
devices. Note that, while medical standards are identified
here, similar requirements may be identified in standards
developed for other domains and therefore the contribution
has a wider application. These standards define:
ISO 14971: the overall risk management process for medi-
cal devices;
ISO 62304: the life-cycle requirements for medical device
software development;
ISO 62366-2: the characteristics of a usability engineering
process suitable for minimizing use errors and use-
associated risks in medical devices.
2.1 Software engineering process
A software engineering process typically includes the fol-
lowing main activities.
1) Requirements. System and software requirements are
defined, including: functional capabilities of the system;
safety, security, and human-factors specifications; crite-
ria and conditions to assess compliance of a software
product to its specification.
2) Software design. A detailed software specification is de-
veloped based on the given requirements.
3) Verification. This includes checking conformity of a de-
sign with the stated requirements.
4) Validation. This involves checking that the requirements
correctly capture the intended characteristics and func-
tionalities of the system to be developed.
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5) Coding / Implementation. Software design documents are
transformed into a concrete implementation for a target
platform.
6) Testing. The software implementation is executed un-
der known conditions and inputs, and its behavior is
compared to expected outputs.
7) Deployment and training. The software is installed in
the target environment, and the necessary training is
provided to end users.
8) Support and maintenance. Activities are carried out to
fix errors/faults, or to improve performance, usability,
security and other quality-related aspects of the system.
These activities are not sequential. They can interleave and
iterate in different ways depending on the particular soft-
ware life-cycle adopted (e.g., waterfall, iterative, agile).
The paper contributes directly to activities 1–3.
• The property templates presented in Section 6 capture
general use-related safety requirements that can pre-
vent use error and facilitate recovery when a use error
occurs (Requirements).
• The use of formal methods technologies such as PVS
contributes to the systematic development of a software
specification (Software design). Whilst this may increase
the initial specification effort, experience shows that
it will lead to reduced costs later in the development
process [11].
• Formal verification of the property templates provides
objective evidence that the software design meets gen-
eral human factors design principles, as recommended
in ISO 62366-2, Annex 1 (Verification).
When a model-based development approach is adopted,
the benefits can also extend beyond activities 1–3.
• Models used within the approach can be imported into
tools such as PVSio-web [9], and converted to realistic
prototypes suitable for both design validation [12] and
training of end users [13].
• The same analysis models can be used as a basis for
code generation [14], thus reducing implementation
cost.
• Verification results can inform test case generation [15],
thus reducing the cost of testing.
2.2 ISO 14971
ISO 14971 describes five distinct activities that are required
to implement a disciplined risk management process. (i) A
hazard analysis is performed to identify all known and fore-
seeable hazards and their causes, where a hazard is defined
as a potential source of physical injury or damage to people
or the environment. (ii) Risk estimation is performed to
assess the probability of occurrence and severity of harm of
each hazard, the combination of which is defined as risk. (iii)
Risk evaluation is conducted to decide if every identified
risk is acceptable based on justifiable acceptability criteria.
(iv) Control measures are designed and implemented to
eliminate the risk, or to reduce it to an acceptable level,
if a risk is considered to be unacceptable. (v) Verification
and validation activities are conducted to ensure that the
designed control measures are effective. These five activities
iterate and interleave until the device’s overall residual risk
after mitigation is acceptable.
This paper contributes to the process described in
ISO 14971 by defining:
• a set of property templates that can be used to generate
requirements that mitigate known use-related hazards
(Activity (iv) in the standard);
• a method for applying existing formal methods tech-
nologies to perform the verification of user interface
software design against the property templates (Activ-
ity (v) in the standard).
2.3 ISO 62304
To demonstrate safety of software artefacts, ISO 62304 re-
quires the definition and adoption of a rigorous develop-
ment process. This requirement applies to any development
strategy (waterfall, incremental, evolutionary, etc.), and fol-
lows from the observation that software testing alone is
not sufficient to demonstrate that the software will operate
safely. One of the key activities necessary to support such
a rigorous process involves the definition of a set of safety
requirements that can be verified based on objective criteria.
The identified set of requirements can be used as a basis
to argue about the safety of the system. The possibility of
verifying the requirements gives developers the means to
demonstrate that the device design is acceptably safe.
Our work contributes to the process described in
ISO 62304 in two ways.
• Property templates define verifiable usability require-
ments of the user interface software design. The tem-
plates are general in the sense that they are not limited
to specific software implementations or architectures.
• Formal methods technologies provide developers with
tools necessary to create objective evidence that a soft-
ware design complies with given requirements.
2.4 ISO 62366-2
ISO 62366-2 defines the characteristics of a usability engi-
neering process suitable for identifying use-related risks that
might arise through poor user interface design. It is an itera-
tive process that includes the following four main activities.
(i) A conceptual user interface design is defined. (ii) Testable
requirements are defined for user interface functions that are
directly related to the safety of the medical device. (iii) A
detailed user interface design is created. (iv) The user inter-
face design is evaluated against the identified requirements.
The standard exemplifies some common violations of user
interface design heuristics. It states that developers need to
take these into account when defining the requirements,
as these violations could lead to use hazards. Examples
include: complex controls or poor mapping of controls to
actions; unclear medical device state; controversial modes,
settings, measurements, or other information; insufficient
visibility, audibility or tactility.
This paper is aligned with ISO 62366-2. It provides:
• property templates based on user interface design
heuristics explicitly mentioned in the standard;
• a process for defining a detailed user interface design
that can be verified, though the use of formal methods
technologies, against the property templates.
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3 THE VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY
The theorem proving system used in this paper is the Proto-
type Verification System (PVS) [16]. It combines an expressive
specification language based on higher-order logic with a
theorem proving assistant. PVS has been used extensively
in several application domains. It provides the usual basic
types such as bool, integer and real. New types can
be introduced either in a declarative form (these types are
called uninterpreted), or through type constructors. Examples
of type constructors, used in the case study, are function and
record types. Function types are denoted [D -> R], where
D is the domain type and R is the range type. Predicates are
functions with Boolean range type. Record types are defined
by listing the field names and their types between square
brackets and hash symbols. For instance, record [# a1:
A1, a2: A2 #] has two fields (a1 of type A1, and a2 of
type A2). The fields of a record type are accessed using the
corresponding field names. Hence if a record r has the type
defined above then a2(r) or r‘a2 can be used equivalently
to access the value of field a2 in record r. Predicate subtyp-
ing is a language mechanism used for restricting the domain
of a type by using a predicate. An example of a subtype is {
x:A | P(x) }, which introduces a new type as the subset
of those elements of type A that satisfy the predicate P. The
notation (P) is an abbreviation of the subtype expression
above. Predicate subtyping is useful for specifying partial
functions. This will be used in the case study when defining
actions that are only permitted given specific constraints.
A specification in PVS is expressed as a collection of
theories which consist of declarations of names for types and
constants, and expressions in terms of these names. Theories
can be parametrized with types and constants, and can use
declarations of other theories by importing them.
Properties of a PVS specification are expressed as named
formulas declared using the keyword THEOREM. Structural
induction will often be used to prove that a given property
is an invariant of the system model. This process involves
proving a property is true of all relevant reachable states
when universal quantification is not possible as will be
discussed in Section 6.
The prelude is a standard library automatically imported
by PVS. It contains useful definitions and proved facts for
types, including among others common base types such
as Booleans (bool) and numbers (e.g., nat, integer and
real), functions, sets, and lists. The prelude has been used
explicitly in the proof of several of the properties developed
from the templates.
The interactive theorem prover of PVS provides a col-
lection of powerful primitive inference procedures that are
applied interactively under user guidance within a sequent
calculus framework. These include propositional and quan-
tifier rules, induction, rewriting, simplification using deci-
sion procedures for equality and linear arithmetic, data and
predicate abstraction. Additional information about the PVS
theorem proving assistant will be given when necessary
in Section 6, while presenting example proofs of property
templates.
4 CASE STUDY OVERVIEW
This section introduces the case study used throughout the
paper as a reference. It will be used to define and illustrate
the use of the property templates for automated analysis of
user interface software.
4.1 A programmable infusion pump
The selected device is an infusion pump (see Figure 2). It
is an existing device [17] used in many hospitals. Infusion
pumps are devices used by clinicians to inject fluids (typ-
ically, medicines or nutrients) into patients. The typical ar-
chitecture of an infusion pump includes the following main
components (see Figure 1): a user interface, which allows
operators to program infusion parameters and monitor the
infusion process; a controller, representing the device compo-
nents that drive the administration process; a pump delivery
mechanism, representing the physical pump that injects the
fluid in the patient; and the giving set representing the tube
that connects a fluid reservoir to the patient.
Infusion pumps are “programmable” in the sense that in-
fusion parameters and pump settings can be configured by
clinicians. The characteristics of this case study are common
to many devices that control the delivery of a therapy over
time. Infusion pumps are used in several contexts within
a hospital, including chemotherapy and intensive care. The
clinician (usually a nurse) sets infusion pump parameters
and connects the patient to the device using the “giving set”
(i.e., a flexible clear plastic tube, one end connected to a
bag with the fluid to be infused, the other end connected
to the patient’s veins through a needle) and then monitors
the infusion process using the device. This type of device
was chosen because it is susceptible to use error. In the
United States, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
as reported in [18], received approximately 56,000 reports
of adverse events relating to infusion pumps between 2005
and 2009 including at least 500 deaths. Many of the adverse
events were use-related. 87 infusion pump recalls have
resulted to address identified safety concerns, according to
FDA data. Of these adverse event reports use error, due
to anomalies in software design and user interface designs,
has been a significant factor. Use error, as mentioned in ISO
62366-2, means for example: number entry errors; confu-
sions over input modes (for example updating the wrong
parameter value), transcription errors from prescription to
device; failure to check that the value has been entered
correctly.
Recent estimates over the whole spectrum of device
types indicate that the number of deaths associated with
preventable adverse events due to use error is over 400,000
per year in the US alone [19]. Mitigation of use errors has
been indicated several times as one of the top priorities in
device design for infusion pumps [20], ventilators [21], and
other interactive medical devices.
4.2 The modes of the user interface
The user interface of the example device is characterized
by a set of entry modes that determine the effect of user
interactions. These modes are specific to the device brand
(although a given manufacturer may have families of de-
vices with similar mode structures). The entry modes are
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Fig. 1. Generic pump architecture (adapted from [22]).
Fig. 2. The pump user interface and actions
used by developers to make most effective use of the keys
and displays available on the device front panel. For ex-
ample, entry modes determine whether chevron keys alter
infusion rate, VTBI (volume to be infused), time or move
the cursor up or down the options or infusion bags menu.
They also have an effect on the function keys (key, key
or key). The mode structure for the device considered in
the case study is relatively complex. This will become clear
later in the paper as properties of the device are identified
and analyzed. A full list of the entry modes of the device
and a brief description of each mode is in Table 1.
5 MODELING USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE DE-
SIGN
Different types of models can be used to describe an in-
teractive system (e.g., focusing on user interface layout or
focusing on the interaction between user and system). The
method to be described here structures models as a set
of actions initiated by the user. The model specifies the
effect that each action has on the state of the device. The
device state is detailed as a set of state attributes. Each state
attribute has a type, e.g., if the attribute is an infusion rate,
as will be described in Section 5.2, then it is a number
restricted to infusion rate values that the operator can input.
Although user action is the focus of the analysis, the model
also includes autonomous actions that describe the ongoing
behavior of the underlying process controlled by the device
(e.g., the amount of fluid infused by the device) insofar as
they affect the user interface. It is not usually possible for
realistic systems to get an understanding of the behavior of
user actions without describing those autonomous actions
that also modify the state of the device.
Some state attributes can be temporarily or permanently
perceivable (usually visible, but could be audible, for ex-
ample in the case of an alarm, or haptic). These attributes
trigger the appropriate use of actions and indicate the effect
when action has been taken. For example, the visibility of an
attribute such as infusion rate can be used by the operator to
decide whether the rate should be increased or decreased to
meet the value prescribed, and what its effect on the patient
should be.
The model of the interactive system also makes it clear
what actions are permitted. The effect of an action can
depend on modes. These modes, unless clearly signposted,
can confuse users about an action’s effect and can be difficult
to understand [23].
5.1 A more rigorous description
A more rigorous definition of the elements of the model
is now introduced. Throughout the paper, the following
naming conventions will be used:
• A indicates the set of actions
• S indicates the set of states of the device
• B is the set { true, false }
• C is a set of state attributes;
• MS is a set of modes
The illustrated PVS models comply with the following struc-
ture.
• Actions are typically partial functions over states of the
system A = S → S. An action may be associated with
a permission function per, which is a predicate that
asserts whether an action is defined for a state in its
domain per : A → (S → B) such that per(a)(s) = true
if a(s) is defined. An action could be, for example,
number entry (pressing a key on a number pad), or a
mode transition (for example pressing an ok key). Entry
of a number may only be permitted if it falls within
specific bounds.
• Functions of the form filter : S→ C will often be used
in the model to extract state attributes. The extracted
attributes will sometimes be linked to corresponding
perceivable elements also represented as attributes. The
function p filter will be used to describe the perceiv-
able counterpart to the filtered value if available, and
the predicate vis filter : C → B may be used to
assert whether a filtered attribute is perceivable. For
example, filter(s) could be a value of a variable in the
underlying process being controlled by the interface,
p filter(s) could be a visible attribute that represents
the variable and vis filter(s) would be true if the
underlying variable is visible.
• A function mode. This function is a particular form of
filter specifically designed to extract state attributes
representing modes of the device. The function is in
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Entry Modes Short Description
rmode Infusion rate can be adjusted; this mode is only available when the pump is paused.
bagmode VTBI can be selected from an infusion bags menu when the user is entering rate and vtbi.
tbagmode VTBI can be selected from the infusion bags menu; this mode is accessed when entering vtbi over time and is only available
when the pump is paused.
qmode Query mode, in which a menu of options is made available to the user.
vtmode VTBI can be adjusted, this also modifies time - calculating time using the infusion rate that has been entered.
vttmode VTBI is being entered in vtbi over time mode that is accessed via the options menu.
ttmode Time is being entered in vtbi over time mode that is accessed via the options menu.
infusemode The home mode when the device is infusing. This mode can be recognised by checking the top part of the display, which
shows “infusing”. This mode also allows the rate to be changed unless the infusion rate has been locked.
nullmode This mode describes a set of display only situations - for example where alarm displayed in top line, or options menu
elicits an information display. In this mode no data entry is possible.
TABLE 1
The entry modes of the device
the form mode : S → MS. Information about modes
will be used in the description of some of the property
templates to be described in the next sections.
The following sub-section exemplifies the use of the model-
ing approach for the selected case study.
5.2 PVS model
The PVS model is specified as a set of three PVS theories.
The first theory contains common definitions of constants
and types. The second theory (hereafter referred to as
the pump theory) contains a specification of the underlying
pump process (cf. Figure 1), which describes basic character-
istics that are common across a variety of infusion pumps,
syringe drivers and PCA (Patient Controlled Analgesia)
pumps. These two theories have been designed to be reused
in the modeling and analysis of other similar devices. Types
are parametrized in these theories, e.g., the type identifying
the range of infusion rates is a parameter that can be set
when importing the theory. This allows maximum flexibility.
These two models can be reused to represent the behavior of
a family of infusion devices supporting different ranges of
infusion rates. These parameters will come into play when
analyzing requirements for the data entry system of the
pump, e.g., in Section 6.4.3, as some of the properties hold
true only under certain conditions on the range values.
The third theory (referred to as the interface theory)
describes features of the user interface software and is
particular to this specific device brand. It describes whether
attributes are perceivable, how the entry modes are handled
by the device, and how the user sets, controls and views
the operation of the pump as specified in the pump theory.
While this theory is specific to the particular infusion prod-
uct, parts of it may be reused, for example, in families of the
same brand of pump.
The specification of the model uses transition functions
to describe actions. These functions take the following form
in PVS (where state is a PVS record type listing the state
attributes of the model):
action(st: state): state
The circumstances in which the actions are permitted must
also be described. This specifies when the action is available
to the user. Note that the availability of an action does
not indicate that it is obvious to the user that the action
is available. Rather, it indicates only that the function can be
activated by the user. A family of action-indexed predicates
of the form:
per_action(st: state): bool
assert whether actions are permitted. An autonomous func-
tion tick describes the effect of updating key underlying
state attributes associated with the pump process at discrete
intervals. When permissions are used then actions will have
the following form of signature in PVS:
action(st: (per_action)): state
which limits the domain of the function to the subset of
states for which the action is permitted. A deterministic
modeling approach is used to describe the effect of each
transition function. That is, each event/action has one pos-
sible effect. The order in which functions are executed is
not fixed in the model, i.e., functions can interleave in any
order. Transition functions are atomic, i.e., the execution of
a transition function is completed before another transition
function is executed. This modeling approach is sufficient to
represent the actual behavior of the user interface and does
not compromise the veracity of the model for the analysis of
the considered requirements.
The state attributes of the pump theory are encapsulated
within a separate state attribute, device, which is itself a
PVS record type. The state attributes for the pump process
model (e.g., vtbi, infusionrate, volume and time) are therefore
referenced as device(st)‘vtbi and so on, where st has
type state and represents the current state of the device.
The developed PVS model of the user interface includes
a description of the display elements that are presented on
the device screen. Specifically, the display elements indi-
cated in Figure 2 are specified. The attribute topline(st)
describes the information contained in the top part of the
display. Actions key, key and key are associated with the
function displays (fndisp1, fndisp2 and fndisp3, respectively).
An array of Booleans (middisp) indicates whether informa-
tion is visible to the user, for example middisp(drate) =
true means that the infusion rate is visible.
The example of the pause function presented in Listing 1
and discussed below illustrates the use of the state attributes
to describe the interaction. The pause function is defined in
the interface theory. It has the effect of pausing the infusion.
The function updates various display elements.
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1 pause(st: (per_pause)): state =
2 st WITH [
3 topline := holding,
4 middisp := LAMBDA (x: imid_type):
5 COND (x = drate) OR (x = dvol) -> TRUE,
6 (x = dvtbi) OR (x = dtime) ->
7 device(st)`vtbi /= 0,
8 ELSE -> FALSE ENDCOND,
9 fndisp1 := fvol,
10 fndisp2 := fvtbi,
11 fndisp3 := fnull,
12 entrymode := rmode,
13 pauselight := TRUE,
14 runlight := FALSE,
15 device := pause(st`device) ]
Listing 1. Transition function pause
The display element topline is set to display the in-
formation “holding” (line 3 in Listing 1), and the function
middisp specifies that infusion rate and volume are made
visible (line 5 in Listing 1), as are vtbi and time if the value
of vtbi is not zero (lines 6-7 in Listing 1). The function
key labels for key and key are set to “volume” and
“vtbi” (lines 9-10 in Listing 1). The function key label for
key is blank (line 11 in Listing 1). The entry mode of the
device is set to rmode (line 12 in Listing 1). This allows
the infusion rate to be changed when the pump is paused
unless the rate has previously been locked. The pause light
is set to on, and the run light switched off (lines 13-14 in
Listing 1). Finally, a call to a function pause, defined in the
pump theory, updates relevant state attributes of the pump
process (line 15 in Listing 1). Hence, the pause function is
overloaded, being defined in both the pump theory and the
interface theory. Disambiguation is carried out as in object-
oriented programming languages, by checking the type of
the function argument.
To complete the specification of the pause function, it is
necessary to indicate when the function is permitted. The
domain of the pause function is specified to be restricted to
those states for which per pause(st) is true. This is indi-
cated in the pause function using the subtyping notation
(per pause) to specify the type of the function argument.
The permission function is defined as follows for the case
study.
per_pause(st: state): bool =
per_pause(st`device) AND no_button_down(st)
AND ((topline(st) = infusing)
OR (topline(st) = dispkvo)
OR (topline(st) = dispvtbi)
OR (topline(st) = volume)
OR (topline(st) = locked))
This specifies that the pause function is permitted when:
• The device is switched on and is infusing. These
constraints are found in the permission function
per pause(st‘device) defined in the pump theory.
• No other button has been pressed or is being pressed
(predicate no button down(st)).
• The top line display shows “infusing” or “KVO” or
“vtbi” or “volume” or “locked”.
This permission includes attributes that are visible to the
user (e.g., the value of topline). This choice is driven by
the fact that the developed specification is a description
of the device behavior of the user interface, and not a
translation of user interface software code. Display elements
are therefore used in the model to describe when actions
are permitted, as this makes the model more readily under-
standable without compromising the veracity of the model.
The other actions in the PVS model are specified using the
same approach.
6 PROPERTY TEMPLATES CAPTURING USABILITY
REQUIREMENTS
The property templates, used in this paper, are generic
mathematical formulas designed to help developers to con-
struct conjectures appropriate to the analysis of user in-
terface features. The templates to be considered are: com-
pleteness, feedback, consistency, reversibility, visibility and
universality. They are based on interaction design guidelines
described, for example, by Nielsen [24], Dix and others [25],
and Thimbleby [26]. Initial formalizations of some of these
guidelines have previously been described in [4], [27] with
a model checking context in mind. Our aim is to establish a
set of template formalizations that can be translated easily
into PVS theorems4.
This section introduces the templates with illustrations
of the use-related concerns captured by each of them. They
are initially formulated in general terms using the concepts
of actions, states, modes (introduced in Section 5), and a
transition relation transit : S×S that relates states that can
be reached by any action. Some templates will be special
cases, syntactically, of others (e.g., the visibility and univer-
sality templates – Sections 6.5 and 6.6 – are special cases
of the state consistency template described in Section 6.3).
However, the goal is not to provide a syntactic classification
of the formulations (as in for example, [28]) but to support
analysts in expressing properties that capture relevant use-
related requirements. The templates are designed to be
useful, acting as triggers for the analyst.
In this section the templates are described and their
instantiations are illustrated using the infusion pump case
study introduced in Section 4. Instantiation involves tailor-
ing the template to the characteristics and functionalities
of the device under analysis, and formulating (based on
the instantiated template) PVS theorems that can then be
analyzed using PVS. Part of this process involves defining
the relation transit based on the actions supported by the
device, and producing precise descriptions of the guards,
goals and filters that are relevant to the PVS theory that
models the interactive behavior of the device under consid-
eration. This process will be described in more detail in the
following sub-sections for each template. Each template will
be motivated in part using ANSI/AAMI HE75:2009 [29] as
a reference. The relevant sections of this document will be
referred to in each template description.
6.1 Completeness template
Accessing device features should require less than three
interactions (Section 21.4.3: User interface structure [29]).
Otherwise the user will consider the feature “buried” in
4. Note that the word ‘theorem’ is used in this section to describe
the syntactic element in the PVS theory that translates a property to be
checked. It does not indicate that the property has been proved.
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the user interface. The completeness template is designed
to address this type of concern, i.e., that the software allows
the user to reach significant states in one (or a few) steps. For
example, being able to reach the “home” screen (where all
infusion parameters are presented) from any device screen
in one step is a completeness property.
Completeness
∀ s ∈ S : guard(s) ∧ ∼ goal(s)
⇒ ∃ a ∈ A : per(a)(s) ∧ goal(a(s)) (1)
The template asserts that there is always a user action
(specified as a) that transforms a state satisfying a predicate
guard : S→ B into a state satisfying predicate goal : S→ B.
For instance, the goal could be true when the system is in
some defined home screen. There may be situations where
it is not possible to reach the home screen in one step or, for
example, the property may only be relevant when the pump
is paused. The guard used in the template makes it possible
to exclude these cases, limiting the property to the situation
of concern. It is envisaged that a final formulation of the
template is always developed in discussion with human fac-
tors specialists and domain experts. This consultation will
consider the implications of these exceptions and determine
appropriate exclusions and definitions.
6.1.1 Instantiation of the completeness template
An instantiation of the completeness template is now il-
lustrated by considering the possibility of reaching certain
home screens when the pump is infusing or paused. These
home screens allow the operator to watch relevant pump
variables, and use the chevron keys to adjust the infusion
rate (unless the infusion rate has previously been locked).
The relevant home screen, when the pump is paused,
is signified to the user by a top line of “holding” or “set
rate”. The device shows this screen automatically at start-
up, or after an alarm has occurred when there has been no
user activity for a period. When the pump is infusing, on
the other hand, the home screen is signified by a top line
display showing “infusing”. In this screen, the clinician can
update the infusion rate (unless the infusion rate is locked).
6.1.2 PVS translation of the completeness template
A PVS theorem for the paused pump is first considered. The
first step in creating the PVS theorem involves specifying the
guard and goal. The goal can be specified as a PVS predicate
goal hosr5 indicating that the top line should be “holding”
or “set rate”.
goal_hosr(st: state): bool =
topline(st) = holding OR topline(st) = setrate
The only constraint imposed by guard is that the pump is
switched on and paused (i.e., not infusing).
simple_guard_hosr(st: state): bool =
device(st)`powered_on? AND NOT device(st)`infusing?
5. Note that in this formulation of goal hosr it is not required that
the key parameters are also visible. This requirement could be added
to the goal, though for illustration it makes the property more complex
because time and vtbi are only actually visible if vtbi is non-zero.
The completeness property simple complete to hosr is
then expressed using the PVS syntax as follows. The prop-
erty aims to check that one of the user actions key or key
will always reach the goal.
simple_complete_to_hosr(st: state): bool =
(simple_guard_hosr(st) AND NOT goal_hosr(st))
IMPLIES (per_key1(st) AND goal_hosr(key1(st))
OR (per_key3(st) AND goal_hosr(key3(st))))
Finally, a PVS theorem is formulated that is suitable to prove
the template. It needs to consider only accessible states, that is
states that can be reached from the initial state of the device
using the actions that the device supports. The PVS theorem
(shown in Listing 2) is therefore formulated as a structural
induction:
• The base step (lines 3-4 in Listing 2) proves that the
property is true of the initial state (init?(st)) in
which all the state attributes are initialized and the
device is switched off.
• The induction step (lines 5-7 in Listing 2) assumes
the property is true of a state (pre) and aims
to prove that the property is also true for all
states post related to pre by the transition relation
state transitions release. This relation is true if
post is related to pre by any of the permitted actions
supported by the device. In this case actions related to
the chevron keys are combined with a release action to
specify that the chevron key is permitted only when
no other key is held down. This reflects the actual
behavior of the device. The full specification, referred
to in Section 1, contains the definition of this relation.
The completeness theorem that follows from these delib-
erations is as follows:
1 simple_comp_pause: THEOREM
2 FORALL (pre, post: state):
3 (init?(pre) IMPLIES
4 simple_complete_to_hosr(pre))
5 AND ((state_transitions_release(pre, post)
6 AND simple_complete_to_hosr(pre))
7 IMPLIES simple_complete_to_hosr(post))
Listing 2. Completeness theorem
6.1.3 PVS analysis of the completeness template
The PVS theorem cannot be proved in the form described in
the previous section. PVS generates counter-examples indi-
cating that the guard predicate simple guard hosr admits
states for which the theorem is false. Refinement of the the-
orem, to exclude the conditions under which the property
fails, may be appropriate. Exclusion can be justified if it
can be demonstrated that these conditions are irrelevant for
the considered property. The process necessary to refine the
completeness theorem is now illustrated.
Consider the sub-goal of the completeness theorem
shown in Listing 3. Sequents [-1], ..., [-5] are assertions that
are true, and can be interpreted as the hypotheses under
which the sub-step is being analyzed. Sequents [1] and [2]
are goals. If either goal is true then the sub-goal of the the-
orem is successfully verified. The symbolic constants pre!1
and post!1 are called skolem constants and are obtained
from pre and post when removing the universal quantifier
over states. Hence, pre!1 represents the state before taking
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the transition, and post!1 represents the state reached by
the model after the transition is taken.
1 simple_comp_pause.2.6.1.5:
2 [-1] ((topline(pre!1) = options) AND
3 (fndisp1(pre!1) = fok) AND
4 (entrymode(pre!1) = qmode))
5 [-2] device(pre!1)`powered_on?
6 [-3] no_button_down(pre!1)
7 [-4] post!1 = key1(pre!1)
8 [-5] simple_complete_to_hosr(pre!1)
9 |-------
10 [1] device(pre!1)`infusing?
11 [2] simple_complete_to_hosr(post!1)
Listing 3. Sub-goal of the completeness theorem
This specific sub-step in the proof involves the action key
(this can be seen by inspecting sequent [-4]). The top line
for the state before the transition shows “options” (line 2 in
Listing 3), the function display for key shows “ok” (line
3 in Listing 3), and the entry mode of the device is qmode
(line 4 in Listing 3).
The case to be proved starts from the hypothesis that
simple complete to hosr is true for pre (sequent [-5]),
and attempts to prove that either the device is infusing
(sequent [1]), or that the property is true for post (sequent
[2]). The value of post can be seen in sequent [-4], i.e., post
is obtained from pre by pressing key.
In attempting the automatic proof of this sub-goal, PVS
stops and presents an unprovable sub-theorem (see List-
ing 4) which can be regarded as a counter-example. The
important elements in Listing 4 are as follows. Sequent [-7]
asserts that the user has selected the menu entry “set vtbi
over time” (see Figure 3 for an illustration of the situation).
The entry mode is qmode (line 10 in Listing 4). Sequent
[-8] asserts that the infusion rate is locked. Sequent [-9]
asserts that, after pressing key, the transition leads to a
new state post! in which the top line shows “locked” (line
5 in Listing 4) and all function key displays are blank (lines
7-9 in Listing 4), meaning that they are not enabled.
1 {-7} setvtbiovertime?(optionsmenu(pre!1)
2 (qcursor(pre!1)))
3 {-8} rlock(pre!1)
4 {-9} post!1 = pre!1 WITH [
5 topline := locked,
6 middisp := LAMBDA (x: imid_type): FALSE,
7 fndisp1 := fnull,
8 fndisp2 := fnull,
9 fndisp3 := fnull,
10 entrymode := qmode ]
11 ... % more sequents omitted
Listing 4. Counter-example for the completeness theorem
This particular counter-example is not a concern because
this device state is temporary. In fact, the PVS model (re-
flecting the behavior of the device) specifies that the device
automatically returns to the previous state. This behavior is
described in the tick function, which models automatic ac-
tions taken by the device. It can therefore be safely excluded
by modifying simple guard hosr.
guard_hosr(st: state): bool =
device(st)`powered_on? AND
NOT device(st)`infusing? AND
(topline(st) /= locked AND
NOT (topline(st) = dispvtbi
AND (entrymode(st) = bagmode
OR entrymode(st) = tbagmode)))
Fig. 3. Selecting vtbi over time when infusion rate is locked
The new guard excludes situations when entering vtbi
where actions keep the device in an entry mode in which
vtbi is entered. For example when selecting an infusion bag,
the only exit is to the “outer” mode where the vtbi value
can be further modified using chevron keys.
Further completeness theorems have a similar format.
For example, in the case that the pump is infusing, “home”
is to return to the entry mode in which the top line shows
“infusing” or “kvo”. The initial guard simply indicates that
the pump is switched on and infusing.
guard_infuse(st: state): bool =
device(st)`powered_on? AND device(st)`infusing?
The goal in this case is that the device displays a top line of
“infusing” or “kvo” (the latter is the display when vtbi has
been exhausted and the pump is continuing the infusion to
keep the vein open).
goal_infuse(st: state): bool =
topline(st) = infusing OR topline(st) = dispkvo
In this case action key should be sufficient to enable users
to move to the home screen in one step. Through a similar
series of attempts and analysis of counter-examples, it can
be found that this initial formulation of the guard is not
strong enough, and again it is necessary to prove the theo-
rem under the hypothesis that the top line is not showing
locked and the device is not in bagmode while infusing.
The final formulation of the guard that makes it possible
to prove the theorem is as follows:
guard_infuse(st: state): bool =
device(st)`powered_on? AND
device(st)`infusing? AND ((topline(st) /= locked)
AND NOT ((topline(st) = dispvtbi) AND
(entrymode(st) = bagmode)))
6.2 Feedback template
Information presented in the user interface should allow
the clinician to understand the effect of important actions
(Section 5.2: Types of use errors [29]). The feedback tem-
plate addresses this concern by describing properties that
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demonstrate that state changes are perceivable. Feedback
may be considered in two contexts. The first is state feedback,
which requires that any change in the state (usually specific
attributes of the state rather than the whole state) is perceiv-
able to the user.
State feedback
∀ s, s ∈ S, guard(s) ∧ guard(s) ∧
filter(s) 6= filter(s)
⇒ visible change(s, s) (2)
More specifically, action feedback requires that a specified ac-
tion always has an effect that is perceivable to the user. The
expression visible change is a place marker that describes
how the perceivable change is represented in the model.
Two choices can be used to instantiate the expression. The
choices differ in how perceivability of attributes is specified
in the model.
Action feedback
∀ a ∈ S → S, ∀ s ∈ S : per(a)(s) ∧ guard(s) ∧
(filter(s) 6= filter(a(s)))
⇒ visible change(s, a(s)) (3)
The first case of visible change assumes that there are
perceivable attributes (p filter(s)) that represent the values
filter(s) (for example, numerals that represent the num-
bers). In this case:
visible change(s, s) :=
(p filter(s) 6= p filter(s))
In the second case, the specification simply indicates that
the attribute extracted by the filter is perceivable, that is
vis filter(s) is true for s ∈ S if filter(s) is perceivable. In
this situation,
visible change(s, s) :=
(vis filter(s) ∧ vis filter(s))
6.2.1 Instantiation of the feedback templates
An instantiation of the feedback templates can be used to
check whether means are provided by the user interface
of the pump to allow a clinician to monitor the infusion
process. This involves making relevant changes of basic
pump variables (i.e., infusion rate, VTBI and time) visible to
the clinician. Hence, example instantiations of the feedback
templates are the following.
• If a pump variable (e.g., infusion rate) is changed, then
that change is visible in the user interface.
• If the entry mode changes, then that change is made
visible in the user interface.
6.2.2 PVS translation of the state feedback template
When considering feedback related to infusion rate, the
relevant filter is:
filter_rate(st: state): irates =
device(st)`infusionrate
where irates is a subtype of reals defining the range of rate
values supported by the device. The visibility or otherwise
of this attribute is defined by a Boolean. As was noted in
Section 5.2 the developed model contains a Boolean function
middisp that specifies whether this and other key attributes
are visible or not. This attribute can be used to define a
predicate vis filter rate representing the filter used in
the state feedback template:
vis_filter_rate(st: state): bool =
middisp(st)(drate)
The feedback property then becomes:
state_feedback_simple(pre, post: state): bool =
(filter_rate(pre) /= filter_rate(post))
IMPLIES (vis_filter_rate(pre)
AND vis_filter_rate(post))
This property is not true for all states. A structural induction
is required. The feedback theorem then is of the following
form:
feedback_rate_theorem: THEOREM
FORALL (pre, post: state):
state_transitions(pre, post)
AND guard_vis_rate(pre) AND guard_vis_rate(post)
AND state_feedback_simple(pre, post)
The transition relation state transitions includes all
actions – in this case, it is not necessary to include the
additional constraint that the chevron key has been released,
as is done in Section 6.1.2 for the completeness template.
Note also that guard vis rate has been included which in
this initial form of the theorem is trivially true. The guard is
further refined in the next sub-section.
6.2.3 PVS analysis of the state feedback template
The initial attempt to prove feedback rate theorem gen-
erates a counter-example indicating that when the top line
shows “vtbi over time” (sequent [-6] in Listing 5) a tempo-
rary attribute newrate is visible (sequent [-8] in Listing 5)
and not the actual infusion rate. The reason for this is that
the actual infusion rate value will be updated only after the
clinician confirms the value by pressing the ok button.
1 [-1] device(pre!1)`powered_on?
2 [-2] nob?(which_press(pre!1))
3 [-3] pressed(pre!1) = 5
4 [-4] fok?(fndisp1(pre!1))
5 [-5] middisp(pre!1)(dnewvtbi)
6 [-6] vtbitime?(topline(pre!1))
7 [-7] ttmode?(entrymode(pre!1))
8 [-8] middisp(pre!1)(dnewrate)
9 [-9] middisp(pre!1)(dnewtime)
10 [-10] newtime(pre!1) = 0
11 ... % more sequents omitted
Listing 5. Counter-example for the feedback theorem
The fact that the displayed value of the infusion rate
is temporary before the confirmation action is important
because if the machine is switched off then the modified
value of infusion rate is lost. This subtle corner case needs
to be discussed with domain experts to make sure that
it is unlikely to lead to dangerous use errors. The team
might recommend, for example, that when switching off
the software automatically saves the modified value and on
restart prompts the user. The current design asks the user
whether the pump variables are to be cleared or restored
to the values they held at close down. This request could
include information about any temporary variables in cases
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such as this one. Prototypes based on the formal model
(using PVSio-web [9]) can be used to present the issues to
the designers, domain and human factors experts.
The following guard can be used to ease the exploration
of additional corner cases. The proof process involves ex-
cluding the highlighted case and continuing the theorem:
guard_rate(st: state): irates =
NOT (topline(st) = vtbitime)
With the above guard, the proof of the theorem can be
completed successfully, indicating that the case with “vtbi
over time” is the only corner case.
6.2.4 PVS translation of the action feedback template
It is to be expected that key user interface variables show
change when the infusion process is running. The action
feedback template is instantiated for the tick action of
the PVS model, which represents progress of the ongoing
infusion process – after each tick, the time to infuse and
the volume to be infused are reduced. When the pump is
paused, these two state attributes no longer change, and the
tick action updates the time delay since the last user action.
A preliminary guard used to formulate the property
requires that the pump must be infusing, and VTBI has
not been exhausted (otherwise the pump infuses to keep
the vein open while alarming to alert the user). Hence the
following guard is employed.
guard_tick(st: state): bool =
device(st)`infusing? AND NOT device(st)`kvoflag
The pump attributes that are the primary focus are the
ones that change, namely vtbi and time. Although infusion
rate should remain unchanged, this state attribute is also
considered here because of its importance to the clinician
in the infusion calculation. Hence the relevant predicate is
defined as follows:
vis_tick(st: state): bool =
middisp(st)(dvtbi) AND middisp(st)(drate) AND
middisp(st)(dtime)
The PVS theorem is as follows, where the tick action is only
defined for specific states as constrained by the permission
per tick.
action_feedback_tick: THEOREM
FORALL (st: state):
(per_tick(st) AND guard_tick(st) AND
guard_tick(tick(st))) IMPLIES vis_tick(tick(st))
The proof is attempted in this case for all possible states
(as opposed to all accessible states). If the proof fails, de-
pending on the type of counter-examples returned by the
theorem prover, either the guard is refined, or the theorem
is reformulated as a structural induction, or genuine design
defects are identified that require re-designing device func-
tions. Refinement may also involve more than one of these
possibilities.
6.2.5 PVS analysis of the action feedback template
The initial formulation of the theorem fails. A revised guard
is developed based on the counter-examples returned by
PVS. When the device is not connected to mains power,
that is flag ac connected is false, then a warning may appear
momentarily in the top line that conceals the displayed
values of the infusion rate. Furthermore, this display does
not show the pump attributes immediately after vtbi is first
exhausted. In that case a display is generated with top
line of “vtbi done” and a function key display “cancel” is
associated with key 3.
guard_tick(st: state): bool =
device(st)`infusing? AND NOT device(st)`kvoflag
AND device(st)`ac_connect
AND topline(st) /= vtbidone
The refined property can be proved successfully. The ex-
ception introduced, however, indicates that when the pump
is not connected to the mains, feedback attributes may be
concealed when the error message is displayed. This could
be a cause for concern. Running infusion pumps on battery
by mistake is a common problem in hospitals. For this
specific infusion pump, however, it could also be argued
that because an alarm is shown to the user when the pump
runs on battery the potential hazard will be avoided. It
could also be argued in this context that the user will be
aware of the situation and therefore recognize the fact that
the pump variables may be obscured from view. Again,
developers need to discuss these arguments with human
factors specialists and domain experts to be assured that the
constraints imposed by the guard are reasonable.
Further action feedback properties have been proved,
e.g., related to the use of the switch action that changes
the device’s power source. This action toggles flag
ac connected in the model. The feedback property requires
that the value of ac connected is always reflected in the
mains and battery lights. The attributes (ac light and
battery light) are two Booleans that specify whether the
mains and battery lights are on. This property shows that
changing from mains to battery and vice-versa is indicated
through the feedback of the two status lights. It does not
show that the status lights have a consistent effect (this will
be proved as a visibility property in Section 6.5).
guard_switch(st: state): bool = per_switch(st)
The relevant action feedback theorem expressed as follows
can be proved automatically in PVS:
action_feedback_switch: THEOREM
FORALL (st: state):
guard_switch(st) IMPLIES
(battery_light(st) /= battery_light(switch(st))
AND (ac_light(st) /= ac_light(switch(st))))
6.3 Consistency template
Users quickly develop a mental model that helps them
interact with a user interface. To encourage the development
of an accurate and complete mental model, a user interface
should be consistent in its layout, screen structure, navi-
gation, terminology, and control elements (Section 21.4.13:
Consistency [29]). The action consistency and state consistency
templates address these concerns. Action consistency is
defined to require that the action consistently changes state
attributes, for example irrespective of what the mode is.
State consistency requires that all states reachable within the
device have a common property, e.g., the function display
“quit” is always associated with the same function key.
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The action consistency template is formulated as a prop-
erty of either a single action, or of a group of actions (we will
refer to them as Act) which may exhibit similar behaviors. A
relation ϕ : C × C connects a filtered state, before an action
occurs (captured by pre filter : S × MS → C), with a
filtered state after the action (captured by post filter : S×
MS → C).
Action Consistency
∀ a ∈ Act, s ∈ S,m ∈MS :
guard(s,m) ∧
pre filter(s,m) ϕ post filter(a(s),m) (4)
Note that both the filters may depend on the mode. As
the template is expressed, the filters are both assumed to
be dependent on mode. In practice this will not always
be true – particularly if the effect of action is to change
mode. In the example to be used as illustration, for the
actions that are considered, the mode does change as a
result of the action but the filter that is used as post filter
depends on the mode before the action is taken. It may
be appropriate in other cases to relax the mode constraint,
either completely or on one of the filters. The relation ϕ is
in the set {=, 6=, <,≤, >,≥}. The guard on states is also
sometimes extended within this template to be sensitive to
mode (guard : S×MS → B).
The state consistency template more generally requires
that for all accessible states, possibly constrained by a guard,
an invariant : S→ B is always satisfied.
State Consistency
∀ s ∈ S : guard(s)⇒ invariant(s) (5)
6.3.1 Instantiation of the consistency templates
A consistency property may require that in a given mode
(defined in the guard), specific attributes (defined in the
filters) are never changed, or alternatively always changed
or may demonstrate that all state changes satisfy consistent
properties. Examples of consistency properties for the illus-
trative device are as follows.
(1) Actions designated as function keys always change the
entry mode.
(2) A chevron key will always change the pump variable
relevant to the entry mode (entrymode) if that mode is
relevant to entry of that type of pump variable. Note
that in some modes chevron keys are used to navigate
the cursor. Different properties will apply in these cases.
(3) When a function key is associated with a soft display
of ok then the value of the relevant pump variable is
changed, when that action is taken, to the value set
within the entry mode.
(4) When a function key shows a soft display of quit then
the value set in the mode is discarded, when that action
is taken, and the pump variable remains the value it
had when it entered the mode.
(5) The same function keys are always associated with the
same soft key displays.
6.3.2 PVS translation of the consistency templates
An example instantiation of state consistency is that quit
never appears as the function key display for key or key.
This is easy to express using the state consistency template.
The invariant in this case is
f3quit_invariant(st: state): bool =
fndisp1(st) /= fquit AND fndisp2(st) /= fquit
The theorem uses the invariant property within a structural
induction as follows:
f3quit_consistent_theorem: THEOREM
FORALL (pre, post: state):
(init?(pre) => f3quit_invariant(pre)) AND
(state_transitions(pre, post) AND
f3quit_invariant(pre) IMPLIES
f3quit_invariant(post))
An example instantiation of action consistency template
relates to the chevron keys that increment or decrement
values, or navigate menus up or down, depending on entry
mode. We formulate a requirement that these actions shall
never change entry mode. The pre filter and post filter
both extract the entry mode, and are of the form:
filter_entrymode(st: state): emodes = entrymode(st)
In this case it is not necessary to use mode as a parameter
as the filter definition is the same in all modes. A transition
function state transitions chevrons is defined that re-
lates a pre state to a post state by a chevron action (sup,
sdown, fup, fdown). The relation ϕ in this case is equality. The
theorem that instantiates the consistency template is:
consistency_entrymode_theorem_chevronkeys: THEOREM
FORALL (pre, post: state):
(state_transitions_chevrons(pre, post))
IMPLIES (filter_entrymode(pre) =
filter_entrymode(post))
6.3.3 PVS analysis of the consistency templates
We consider the ok example (3) shown in Section 6.3.1
in more detail. The guard requires that key is permit-
ted and that the function display shows ok. The guard is
parametrized by entry mode and excludes the case of entry
mode being vttmode (i.e., vtbi is being entered in vtbi over
time mode, see Table 1). The failure of the theorem in the
case of vttmode is because the system supports a sequence
of actions. Updates are not made until both vtbi and time
have been entered. At the interim stage defined by vttmode
the process is not complete and should make a smooth
transition to ttmode (i.e., when time is being entered). The
example infusion device allows entry of both vtbi and rate
and vtbi and time. However the mechanism for entry in
each case is different. The differences between the two are
sufficiently significant that they would lead to a discussion
with relevant parties about whether the inconsistency is a
problem.
guard_em_ok(em: emodes, st: state): bool =
per_key1(st) AND fndisp1(st) = fok
AND entrymode(st) = em
AND entrymode(st) /= vttmode
Other counter-examples include when the ok function key
display does not appear. This happens in the cases of entry
modes when infusion rate is being updated (that is rmode
and infusemode). It also occurs in the bag modes (bagmode
and tbagmode) when the temporary value of vtbi is updated
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with the bag specified by the selected menu item before
returning to the vtbi entry modes (vtmode and vttmode). The
pump variable vtbi is not updated using ok until exiting
vtmode. In the case of vttmode, transition is made to a mode in
which time is updated and the pump variable is not updated
at that stage (hence the exception). The “real” value filter
extracts the actual attribute that is updated and used in the
pump process for each of these modes.
The filters used in establishing the consistency both
depend on the entry mode before the action is taken. The
“temporary” value before key is pressed is defined in this
case as:
temp_mode_filter(em: emodes, st: state): real =
COND
em = rmode -> device(st)`infusionrate,
em = infusemode -> device(st)`infusionrate,
em = vtmode -> newvtbi(st),
em = vttmode -> newvtbi(st),
(em = bagmode OR em = tbagmode) ->
COND bagscursor(st) = 0 -> 0,
bagscursor(st) = 1 -> 50,
bagscursor(st) = 2 -> 100,
bagscursor(st) = 3 -> 200,
bagscursor(st) = 4 -> 250,
bagscursor(st) = 5 -> 500,
bagscursor(st) = 6 -> 1000,
bagscursor(st) = 7 -> 1500,
bagscursor(st) = 8 -> 2000,
ELSE -> 3000 ENDCOND,
em = ttmode -> newtime(st),
ELSE -> device(st)`infusionrate
ENDCOND
and the “real” filter specifies the actual pump parameters
that are updated when the ok action is taken. Again the
filtered value depends on the entry mode before the action.
real_mode_filter(em: emodes, st: state): real =
COND
em = rmode -> device(st)`infusionrate,
em = infusemode -> device(st)`infusionrate,
em = vtmode -> device(st)`vtbi,
em = vttmode -> device(st)`vtbi,
em = bagmode -> newvtbi(st),
em = tbagmode -> newvtbi(st),
em = ttmode -> device(st)`time,
ELSE -> device(st)`infusionrate
ENDCOND
The instantiation of the consistency template leads to the
following theorem:
consistency_ok_em: THEOREM
FORALL (em: emodes, st: state):
guard_em_ok(em, st) IMPLIES
temp_mode_filter(em, st) =
real_mode_filter(em, key1(st))
Further consistency properties can be proved subject to
relevant constraints applied through specified guards.
• When the function display shows quit then key takes
the top line to show “holding”.
• When top line is volume and the infusion pump is not
infusing then key always changes volume infused to
zero and changes the entry mode to rmode.
6.4 Reversibility template
Users may perform incorrect actions, and the device should
provide appropriate reversing functions that allow users to
easily stop, modify, and restart the automated processes in
the case of problems or abnormal situations (Section 20.2.4:
User understanding of the automation [29]). An example of
such a function is an “undo” function in an editor, or in the
case of a number entry action, an “increment value” action
to reverse the effect of a “decrement value”. The reversibility
template is formulated for a group of actions Act ⊂ S → S
using guard : S → B, and a filter : S → C relevant to the
entry mode. For each a ∈ Act, there corresponds a b ∈ Act
such that:
Reversibility
∀ s ∈ S : guard(s)⇒
filter(b(a(s)) = filter(s)) (6)
Note that this property could be formulated to be sensitive
to mode. We chose to deal with each mode separately to
ease formulation and verification of the property.
6.4.1 Instantiation of the reversibility template
Reversibility can be used to ensure that data entry with
chevron keys allows the clinician to undo a value change
with a single reversing action in the example infusion pump.
We consider one example to illustrate the process, namely
that “single chevron up” can be used to reverse the effect of
“single chevron down”.
6.4.2 PVS translation of the reversibility template
A guard needs to be specified to construct the PVS theorem
for infusion rate entry requiring that the device is ready to
enter the infusion rate (rate entry ready). Additionally,
the guard should require that the relevant action, and its
reverse action, are enabled. The guard can be specified as
follows in PVS:
guard_supsdown_rate(st: state): bool =
rate_entry_ready(st) AND per_sdown(st)
AND per_sup(release_sdown(sdown(st)))
where rate entry ready takes into account the fact that
rate values can be entered only when device is switched on
and the infusion rate is not locked (line 2 in Listing 6), and
that the entry mode actually allows the clinician to enter
rate (lines 3-4 in Listing 6).
1 rate_entry_ready(st: state): bool =
2 switchedon?(st) AND NOT rlock(st)
3 AND (entrymode(st) = rmode
4 OR entrymode(st) = infusemode)
Listing 6. Guard for the reversibility theorem
6.4.3 PVS analysis of the reversibility template
The reversibility theorem is proved by first considering pairs
of chevron keys, and a specific parameter (vtbi, rate or time).
Proving each theorem based on the template initially results
in failure. The failures indicate anomalies at certain values
or ranges of values. These are compensated by augmenting
the guard as will be illustrated. For example, let us check
whether sup can be used to undo sdown, in the case of
infusion rate:
supsdown_rate: THEOREM FORALL (st: state):
guard_supsdown_rate(st) IMPLIES
filter_rate(release_sup(sup(
release_sdown(sdown(st))))) = filter_rate(st)
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This part of the reversibility theorem fails. The first counter-
example that reveals an issue is as follows:
[-13] device(st!1)`infusionrate < 100
[-14] (ceiling(10 * device(st!1)`infusionrate)
- 1) / 10 > maxrate
[-15] holding?(holding)
|-------
[1] device(st!1)`infusing?
[2] device(st!1)`vtbi = 0
[3] rlock(st!1)
[4] maxrate = 0
This counter-example suggests that it is necessary to con-
strain the parameterized constant maxrate (sequent [4]) –
the theory is parametrized to allow the analysis of different
designs (as discussed in Section 5.2). Experimentation with
the device under analysis and other similar devices indicates
that a reasonable hypothesis is to set the maximum rate to be
at least 1000. This constraint is added to the existing guard.
As a result of this change, a further counter-example is
revealed:
[-15] device(st!1)`infusionrate < 100
[-16] maxrate > 1000
|-------
[1] device(st!1)`infusing?
[2] (device(st!1)`vtbi = 0)
[3] rlock(st!1)
[4] (ceiling(10 * device(st!1)`infusionrate)
- 1) / 10 > maxrate
[5] (ceiling(10 * device(st!1)`infusionrate)
- 1) / 10 < 0
[6] (ceiling(10 * device(st!1)`infusionrate)
- 1) / 10 = 0
[7] floor(ceiling(10 *
device(st!1)`infusionrate)) / 10 =
device(st!1)`infusionrate
This particular branch of the proof is focusing on the case
infusionrate < 100 (see sequent [-15]). The goal to prove
in this branch is in sequent [7]:
floor(ceiling(10 *
device(st!1)`infusionrate)) / 10 =
device(st!1)`infusionrate
Sequents [4] – [6] suggest that additional conditions need
to be introduced to take into account the decimal accuracy
supported by the device. In fact, in the specific range con-
sidered in the branch, the device allows only one decimal
place.
A further attempt to prove the theorem with this addi-
tional constraint returns a further counter-example. Indeed
in proving all the reversibility theorems relating to chevron
keys several anomalies can be identified.
• Applying double chevron up to 99 and then applying
double chevron down produces 90.
• Applying double chevron down to 100 and then apply-
ing double chevron up produces 91.
• Applying single chevron up to 99.9 and then applying
single chevron down produces 99.
• Applying single chevron down to 100 and then apply-
ing single chevron up produces 99.9.
The team of experts would likely argue that these anomalies
are unacceptable in that they increase the likelihood of fail-
ure when attempting to recover from data entry error. In this
analysis our aim was to scope the problem, recognizing the
cases where these anomalies occur. Therefore in the lowest
range case, being used here as an example, the following
constraint was used.
maxrate > 1000 AND v <100 AND v >= small_step/10
AND floor(v*10) = v*10 AND ceil_rate(v*10) = v*10
where v is a shorthand for device(st)‘infusionrate.
It is clear that this theorem has highlighted issues about
the way the number entry behaves that could affect the
usability of the device. After producing this analysis, we
noticed that new releases of the device firmware have fixed
these corner cases. The chevron keys now have the required
reversing effect and therefore the more general theorem can
be proved for the new firmware.
6.5 Visibility template
Visual or auditory cuing should be used to draw the user’s
attention to important information necessary for correct
decision-making (Section 25.3.3: Design guidance related
to cognitive capabilities and limitations [29]). The visibility
template is designed to help the analyst identify situations
where users must be made aware of relevant status informa-
tion about the system. It does this by describing a relation
between relevant state attributes (which may not necessarily
be visible to the user) and user interface elements that are
perceivable. This template complements the feedback tem-
plates described in Section 6.2, which deal with awareness of
changes.
Visibility
∀ s, s ∈ S : transit(s, s) ∧ guard(s) ∧
visible(s)⇒ visible(s) (7)
The predicate visible relates the filtered attribute(s) (filter)
to the relevant visible attributes (p filter(s)):
visible(s) := (filter(s) = p filter(s))
6.5.1 Instantiation of the visibility template
An example instantiation of the visibility template for infu-
sion pumps is a property that requires that the status of
the pump process is always unambiguously mirrored in
the user interface. This includes, for example, displaying
the power status (on battery, or connected to mains) and
lighting up the “paused” light and “run” light according to
the status of the pump process.
6.5.2 PVS translation of the visibility template
The property to be proved in this case is:
visible_run(st: state): bool =
run_filter(st) = run_p_filter(st)
run filter and run p filter are defined as:
run_filter(st: state): bool =
device(st)`powered_on? AND device(st)`infusing?
and
run_p_filter(st: state): bool =
runlight(st) AND NOT pauselight(st)
and the PVS theorem is:
0098-5589 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSE.2018.2804939, IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering
15
visible_run_theorem: THEOREM
FORALL (pre, post: state):
(init?(pre) => visible_run(pre))
AND ((state_transitions(pre, post)
AND visible_run(pre)) IMPLIES visible_run(post))
The guard has been omitted in the formulation because
no constraints are required to complete the proof of this
theorem. Further visibility properties can be formulated to
demonstrate the visual distinctness of entry modes. The
following property provides the link between entry mode
rmode and the top line display.
visible_rmode(st: state): bool =
guard_vis_rmode(st) IMPLIES
rmode_filter(st) = rmode_p_filter(st)
Filters and guards are defined as follows:
rmode_filter(st: state): bool =
entrymode(st) = rmode
rmode_p_filter(st: state): bool =
topline(st) = holding OR topline(st) = setrate
guard_vis_rmode(st: state): bool =
topline(st) /= locked
The case that is excluded by the guard is when the infusion
rate is locked and the user presses a chevron key – the
top line shows a temporary screen where the top line is
“locked”.
6.6 Universality template
Specific guidelines are concerned with the design of user
interface elements such as soft keys (e.g., on-screen labels
and soft keys should be consistent between data screens),
knobs (e.g., rotating the knob in a particular direction should
change a value in a particular way), and touchscreen user
interfaces (e.g., whenever possible, touch targets should be
placed in the same location on every screen) (Section 21.4.11:
Special interactive mechanisms [29]).
Universality captures these concerns. It is designed to be
useful when the analyst requires that focused state attributes
always have defined values. Universality is a particular
example of consistency designed to encourage the analyst
to consider these circumstances. Universality differs from
visibility because it is concerned with the relation between
perceivable attributes or between other state attributes, for
example mode and internal state attributes. Visibility on the
other hand always relates a state attribute to a perceivable
state attribute. The formulation of the universality template
is as follows:
Universality
∀ s, s ∈ S : transit(s, s) ∧ guard(s) ∧
universal(s)⇒ universal(s) (8)
where
universal(s) := (filter(s) = filter(s))
Fig. 4. The same function keys are always shown when top line is
“volume”.
6.6.1 Instantiation of the universality template
A universality property for the example is that a particular
top line display is always associated with the same function
key displays. In this case two sets of display attributes are
related. For example, we may want to prove that whenever
the top line shows “volume”, the function displays for the
three action keys are “blank”, “clear” and “quit” respec-
tively, see Figure 4.
6.6.2 PVS translation of the universality template
The universality property discussed in the previous sub-
section involves instantiations such as the following:
pred_filter_volume_keys(st: state): bool =
(topline(st) = volume)
pred_filter_keys_volume(st: state): bool =
fndisp1(st) = fnull AND fndisp2(st) = fclear
AND fndisp3(st) = fquit
Hence, the universality property becomes:
universality_volume_keys(st: state): bool =
pred_filter_volume_keys(st) =
pred_filter_keys_volume(st))
This property can be proved in PVS using structural induc-
tion.
7 DISCUSSION
The techniques described in the paper have been applied
to medical devices but are clearly applicable to a broader
range of systems. Preliminary studies have explored aspects
of a nuclear power interface [30] and the flight control unit
of a large commercial aircraft [31]. It is clear that there are
many real systems whose user interfaces can be analyzed in
this way. Important features, not yet explored but scheduled
for future work, relate to interfaces that depend on access
to large scale databases and networked data. Modeling
techniques are required to provide suitable abstractions for
these extensions as well as property templates that will help
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developers consider appropriate usability concerns. This is
relevant to the current example in relation to new develop-
ments defined to verify and control the entry of prescrip-
tions for particular medications (in the case of the device
used in the case study this is referred to as “Guardrails”).
This is a topic also under development as part of the analysis
of a newly designed pill dispenser device and analysis of the
Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) [32].
Model checking and theorem proving can both perform
analyses of the type described in the paper but at different
levels of detail. With the model checking technology that we
used, the technology was considered to be easier to under-
stand, but it was often necessary to simplify models, making
them more abstract, to make the process tractable. Model
checking is algorithmic which means that when the property
is true it is not necessary to understand how to prove it is
true. When it fails, counter-examples are produced that can
be used to correct the model or to change the model or to
understand why the property fails. Using the model check-
ing tools, performance deteriorated rapidly as the model
grew and then became infeasible to use in an interactive
style. In the example used in this paper, performance of
the verification tool was an important consideration because
an analysis of the full number entry system was required
as part of the process. For these reasons, and because the
alternative technology was familiar to us, theorem proving
was used as the basis for analysis.
Four issues were important in the analysis and are topics
of current and future research.
• The model accurately reflected the fielded system (see
Section 7.1).
• The process of producing theorems that reflected use-
related requirements was capable of mechanization (see
Section 7.2).
• Tools were available that would ease the modeling and
proof process (see Section 7.3).
• The approach was relevant to actual or proposed certi-
fication requirements (see Section 7.4).
We briefly address these issues in this section, mentioning
relevant research, and describing current plans for further
research.
7.1 Modeling and specification
Our approach assumes that a model is constructed from an
existing system. This model was developed by hand using
the user manual of the device, a simulation6 and the device
itself. Tools also exist for generating models from program
code using transformation rules that guarantee correctness
(see [33] and [34]) but program code was not available to
us. States of the earlier MAL model [6] on which the PVS
specification was based had been analyzed by examining the
traces of actions produced by the model checker, as counter-
examples, with actual sequences generated by the device
itself.
When the template properties were proved of the the-
ory, then any counter-examples discovered, as proof of the
theorems were attempted, were compared with the actual
6. http://cs.swan.ac.uk/∼cspo/simulations/medical/
infusionpump/agp/ downloaded 8/4/17
device. A prototype was produced automatically, as a fur-
ther process of validation, from the model to compare the
“look and feel” of the actual device with the prototype,
see [35] for details. The simulations were indistinguishable
from the behavior of the physical device. The only difference
between the simulation and the real device was that precise
timings differed. This difference, however, is not relevant for
the considered use-related properties. The simulations were
generated with the aim that the developed device models
could be explored by regulator or manufacturer (this allows
them to gain confidence that the model correctly represents
the actual device behavior). It is of course the case that they
only allow an exploration of the paths that the regulator
chooses to explore. The same simulations in our case are also
used to illustrate what the failure of a property means. Part
of the argument to the regulator that this is acceptable may
then involve a demonstration of the features of the device
that fail the requirement, showing that they do not present
a risk.
The described device is typical of a range of medical
devices indicating that the modeling approach scales to
devices of this kind. The techniques described can therefore
deal with this scale but further work is required to analyze
devices and requirements that relate to networked devices
as well as more complex data structures. An important
limitation of a theorem proving approach is the inability to
express, simply, temporal properties. This means that reach-
ability and liveness properties are not simple to analyze
with a theorem prover. For this reason it makes sense to
consider the complementary use of model checking and the-
orem proving tools. Further properties, for example relating
to time, and to multiple viewpoints within a collaborative
configuration of device, are currently being considered.
7.2 Mechanised analysis of the property templates in
PVS
Proofs of the properties were developed using a pragmatic
approach. In many cases universal quantification of states
was first attempted, before moving to a structural induction.
The process of proof therefore uses the following heuristics.
1) The PVS theorem is formulated and the proof at-
tempted for all possible states.
2) If the proof fails then either the PVS theorem is refined
to exclude irrelevant cases or the theorem is reformu-
lated as a structural induction.
3) If the structural induction fails then the PVS theorem
may also be refined to exclude irrelevant cases.
Proof therefore is a process of refinement that takes
account of possible exceptions. Counter-examples are dis-
covered while the proof is attempted. This may be because
the property is wrongly formulated (as illustrated in some of
the cases above), or because the theory fails to represent the
behavior of the device accurately, or because the device fails
to satisfy the requirement. It is therefore always necessary
to consider carefully the nature of the failure identified in
the proof. The PVSio-web tool [9] can be used to present
and discuss the counter-example with domain experts and
human factors specialists. When the failure can be com-
pensated, the theorem is extended by changing the guard
or in some cases qualifying the goal. If the device fails to
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satisfy the requirement with significant consequences this
may indicate the need for redesign. However it is also
possible that the failure is not significant. For example it
may be considered highly unlikely to be an issue in practice
or it may be the case that the broader system defends against
the discovered weakness. This may be achieved by requiring
that an operating procedure must be followed to avoid the
circumstance. In this sense, the failure can be compensated.
Deciding what to do when a property is not true needs to
be carefully evaluated. In the case study under considera-
tion, this was usually not a difficult process. However in
some circumstances the appropriate step may be difficult to
establish and require further analysis from a human factors
perspective, for example through user studies.
The representation of counter-examples is less clear than
is the case with model checking tools such as the IVY
tool. Typically it requires some understanding of the details
of PVS to make full use of them. Further research and
development is required to make the nature of the counter-
example more transparent to the broader range of analysts.
This is discussed again briefly in the next sub-section. At
this stage the analysis of counter-examples is a manual
process and requires some knowledge of the proof system.
As mentioned in the conclusion, an important next step in
this research is to produce tools to support this process.
7.3 Modeling and proof tools
Tools are being developed, by the authors and others, that
are designed to be accessible to developers who are not
specifically expert using formal techniques. These develop-
ments include the following.
• Specification templates or patterns are being designed
to ease the construction of formal specifications, see
for example Bowen and Reeves [36] who focus on
specifications of interactive behavior.
• Patterns have been designed to ease the process
of generating properties as originally described by
Dwyer [37]. The templates used in this paper are based
on this work and our earlier work using model check-
ing techniques [27].
• Tools are being developed for presenting proofs and
counter-examples to aid comprehension, for example
earlier work upon which this paper is based [38].
• Strategies have been devised and mechanized to sup-
port proof, for example early work in the context of
SCR [39].
• Approaches designed to ease the development of mod-
els of interactive systems have been developed, for
example Degani [40] uses a statechart based approach
to modeling devices as well as the user’s model of the
device and Berstel and others [41] describe a framework
for describing widget level interface behavior.
Tailoring these tools to the particular requirements de-
scribed in this paper is part of our ongoing research. Further
templates would include, for example, those that relate to
timing and error recovery. Tools are being developed to
facilitate the construction of conjectures from the templates,
using an analogous approach to that provided by the IVY
tool [27] tailored to PVS conjectures. Presenting counter-
examples in a simple format and supporting general tactics
for proof are each more complicated. The tools and tech-
niques described in the paper and their developments will
only be valuable if they can be used readily by developers,
more specifically those whose task it is to produce the
documentation and evidence that a design is such that
risks associated with it are as low as reasonably practicable.
Experience of using similar techniques with the IVY tool is
described in [42]. This work involved a team of developers
producing a risk analysis for a dialysis machine. Require-
ments were developed collaboratively and formulated by a
member of the team who was familiar with the IVY tool
and its modeling notations. It was possible to formulate
properties, based on requirements, attempt to prove them,
and make modifications if necessary within a risk meeting
without seriously disrupting the flow of the meeting. Where
more serious issues were found these were analyzed outside
the context of the meeting within an hour. It is envisaged
that a similar process is feasible using the technologies de-
scribed in this paper but further evaluations are envisaged
to assess the usability of these tools and their developments.
7.4 Relevance to medical devices and certification
Certification authorities typically require that risk control
measures are included as requirements (see ISO 62304 [43]
for example), and that the identified control measures are
verified, and the verification documented. Verification typi-
cally means that some form of systematic testing has taken
place. The document explaining the verification should doc-
ument a trace: from hazardous situation to user interface
behavior; from the user interface behavior to the software
feature causing the problem; from the software cause to
the risk control measure, and to the verification of the risk
control measure. Examples of use errors identified in the us-
ability standard ISO 62366 [29] for medical devices include
ergonomic concerns (confusing buttons, cracking catheter
connectors) but also include the software issues relevant to
the present paper: over-reliance on the alarm system; user
enters incorrect sequence; user takes a short cut and omits
important steps, defeating software interlock. ISO 62366
argues that causes of use error include ambiguous or unclear
medical device state or controversial modes or mappings.
Here we have demonstrated that formal techniques may
be used to verify these risk control measures. The process
of proving regulatory requirements has been discussed in
more detail in [44], [45]. This process is typically interactive
and in principle involves discussion with both human fac-
tors specialists, who are engaged in checking the validity
of the interpretation of the user-related requirement, and
regulator to check that the property captures the spirit of
the original requirement. Templates can provide a source for
the requirements that form the software control measures.
This approach can be a key component of the broader
safety analysis process increasing the confidence provided
by software testing and trials, see [42].
8 RELATED WORK
Property templates have been studied extensively in en-
gineering practices. Most of the effort, however, has been
devoted to the control part of a system, rather than the
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human-machine interface. For example, such analysis in re-
lation to complex systems has been discussed in [46] where
verification patterns are introduced that can be used for
the analysis of safety interlock mechanisms in interoperable
medical devices. An example of such a pattern as “When
the laser scalpel emits laser, the patient’s trachea oxygen level
must not exceed a threshold ΘO2”. Although, superficially, this
property appears to be use-related the aim of their patterns
is to facilitate the introduction of a model checker in the
actual implementation of the safety interlock, rather than
defining property templates for the analysis of use-related
aspects of the safety interlock. Other similar work, e.g., [47]–
[49], also introduce mechanisms similar to templates for the
verification of safety interlocks, but the focus of them is
again on translating verified design models into a concrete
implementation – in [47], for example, the automatic trans-
lation of hybrid automata models of a safety interlock into
a concrete implementation.
Proving requirements similar to the properties produced
from our templates of this paper has been the focus of the
work of Atlee and Gannon [50] as well as Heitmeyer’s team
using SCR [51]. The latter approach uses a tabular nota-
tion to describe requirements which makes the technique
relatively acceptable to developers. Combining simulation
with model checking has also been a focus in, for example,
[52]. Braderman and others [53] focused on the role of
scenarios in model checking real-time properties of systems
and Mori and others [54] used task representations based
on a LOTOS like language to analyze user tasks by means
of simulation. Recent work concerned with simulations of
PVS specifications provides valuable support to this com-
plementarity [35]. Had the specification been developed as
part of a design process then a tool such as Event B [55]
might have been used. Singh et al demonstrate a refine-
ment process from tabular expressions using Event B [56].
In such an approach an initial model is first developed
that specifies the device characteristics and incorporates the
safety requirements. This model is gradually refined using
details about how specific functionalities are implemented.
Several GUI testing tools have been developed for Android
Apps, Java, and Windows Applications (see [57] for a recent
overview). For example, van der Merwe et al [58] use the
Java PathFinder model checker as a basis to discover design
errors in the user interface of Android Apps. These tools fo-
cus on implementation errors such as unhandled exceptions,
concurrency errors, and null pointer dereferencing rather
than properties that would relate to use errors.
Bowen and Reeves [36] focus on design patterns for
creating user interface models, rather than verification of
use-related requirements. An example pattern is the callback
pattern, representing the behavior of confirmation dialogs
used to confirm user operations. They are also concerned
with generating properties or obligations for the proof of
interactive systems, with a particular focus on medical sys-
tems [59], [60]. Further relevant work by them focuses on
modeling user manuals [61].
9 CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the formulation of use-related require-
ments has the effect of improving usability and use-related
safety of interactive systems. The requirements that have
been described are related to the usability heuristics often
used in the informal analysis of interactive systems [62]. The
model and theorems based on the templates can be found
in the repositories referred to in Section 1. The model, as
discussed, involves two main theories describing 38 pump
actions and 18 user interface actions. The analysis involved
138 theorems based on the templates. The theory files
amount to approximately 4000 lines including comments,
and the theorem files approximately 5000 lines. The run
time for each proof is indicated in the template files. Times
range from 1 hour 19 minutes to less than 1 second. The PVS
system was installed on an Apple Macbook Pro with a 2.9
GHz Intel Core i5.
The paper addresses two questions: how to support
the analyst in the process of identification and analysis of
properties of a user interface software design to improve
the clarity of the user interface; and how to structure the
specification of the design and formulate the properties so
that it is feasible to establish the practice as part of the
development of user interfaces.
While PVS is conceptually rich, the proposed style of
specification based, as it is, on state transitions is amenable
to development. The property templates aim to provide
clear guides to the developer as they consider and then
prove properties of the specification. The process of de-
veloping the properties from the templates is valuable in
recognising areas where the properties fail, and this triggers
further consideration of the design of the interface.
The examples illustrate the process, demonstrating how
the development of theorems becomes a systematic process.
The steps involved in the analysis process are made clear.
A further step in this process will be to provide specialized
tool support so that templates can be offered to the analyst
with the means to define the guards, goals and filters that
are relevant to the device under consideration. The illus-
trated example is realistic and the proofs demonstrate the
feasibility of the approach for a relatively large specification.
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